‘Structurally Sound Despite Defective Radar and Overdue Life Rafts’: MARAD Official Defends Decision Not to Ground MV Barima Months Before Deadly Sinking
By Travis Chase | HGP Nightly News |
GEORGETOWN, GUYANA — The Presidential Commission of Inquiry (COI) investigating the catastrophic MV Barima maritime disaster has heard startling testimony that multiple critical navigation and lifesaving deficiencies were documented aboard the ferry eight months prior to the tragedy—yet state maritime regulators deemed the defects insufficient to pull the vessel from active passenger service.
Testifying before the Commission on Tuesday as public hearings resumed under Chairman retired Justice Godfrey Smith, SC, Acting Marine Superintendent for the Maritime Administration Department (MARAD), Christopher Bailey, admitted that a November 2025 regulatory inspection uncovered an inoperable radar, missing tracking equipment, and overdue life rafts.
Despite those findings, Bailey maintained before the inquiry that none of the deficiencies warranted grounding the 87-year-old vessel, asserting that a visual inspection left him satisfied that the ferry was fit to continue operating. Crucially, no evidence was presented to the Commission during Bailey’s testimony confirming that any of those defects had been rectified before the MV Barima departed Georgetown on its fatal July 18, 2026 voyage.
November 2025 Inspection: Critical Navigation and Safety Deficiencies
Under questioning before the Commission, Bailey detailed the specific mechanical, navigational, and lifesaving failures recorded during his November 2025 assessment of the Transport and Harbours Department (T&HD) ferry:
- Inoperable Radar System: The vessel’s primary marine radar was non-functional at the time of inspection, depriving the bridge of electronic collision-avoidance and coastal navigation capabilities.
- Absence of AIS: The ferry was operating without an Automatic Identification System (AIS), the mandatory maritime transponder technology used to broadcast vessel position and enable tracking by shore stations and nearby ships.
- Expired Life Raft Certification: Bailey acknowledged that the vessel’s inflatable life rafts were overdue for mandatory statutory servicing and recertification.
- Missing Bridge Distress Signals: There were no emergency distress flares stored on the navigation bridge.
- Compromised Power Redundancy: One of the MV Barima’s two onboard electrical generators was offline and undergoing maintenance during the inspection.
Clashing Accounts on Life Jackets: Inspection Records vs. Survivor Testimony
Bailey’s testimony also highlighted a sharp contradiction between MARAD’s pre-disaster inspection records and the harrowing accounts previously given to the Commission by survivors of the sinking:
- MARAD’s Account: Bailey testified that approximately 200 life jackets were inspected aboard the vessel in November 2025 and were accessible to passengers and crew at that time.
- Survivor Rebuttal: That testimony stands in direct conflict with earlier evidence from survivors of the July 18 disaster, who told the Commission that life jackets were locked away and inaccessible as the ferry took on water and sank off the Essequibo coast.
‘Visually Sound’: Regulator Defends Keeping 87-Year-Old Ferry in Service
Asked to justify why a passenger vessel lacking working radar, AIS, bridge flares, and certified life rafts was permitted to remain in commercial service, Bailey relied on the physical appearance of the hull and machinery spaces:
- Visual Hull Assessment: Bailey maintained that the 87-year-old ferry appeared “structurally sound” during his visual inspection.
- Dry Engine Room: He noted that there was no water accumulation in the engine room and argued there was nothing observed during his walkthrough to suggest the vessel was unsafe to continue operating.
- No Proof of Pre-Departure Repairs: Throughout Bailey’s appearance on the stand, the Commission was presented with no documentary evidence or clearance certificates demonstrating that the radar, AIS, life rafts, flares, or secondary generator had been repaired or replaced prior to the ferry’s departure from Georgetown on July 18.
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry continues its evidentiary hearings in Georgetown as commissioners examine regulatory oversight, vessel maintenance records, and operational compliance at both MARAD and the Transport and Harbours Department.


