GECOM Commissioner Alexander Argues Constitution Insulates Commissioners from Political Removal
By Marvin Cato | HGP Nightly News
GEORGETOWN, GUYANA — Opposition-appointed Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) Commissioner Vincent Alexander has argued that the country’s constitution deliberately insulates sitting commissioners from removal by political parties — including the party that nominated them — in order to preserve the independence and integrity of the electoral body.
Alexander, who is among the commissioners whose positions have been placed in question following the new Leader of the Opposition’s stated intention to recall and replace opposition-nominated GECOM commissioners, made the remarks in an interview on Politics 101 with host Dr. David Hinds.
Alexander has a direct personal interest in the legal question he is addressing — his own tenure as commissioner is among those potentially affected by the opposition leader’s stated intentions. His argument is presented here as his legal interpretation, not as settled law.
The Constitutional Framework
Alexander said the 2000-2001 constitutional amendments fundamentally changed the nature of GECOM by making it a permanent institution.
“A 2000 amendment provided for a permanent commission,” he said. “In other words, there is no expiry date of the commission and there is no term specified for the commission.”
He noted that prior to 2001, electoral commissions in Guyana were temporary bodies, convened specifically for the duration of an election cycle and dissolved three months after balloting. The modern framework, he said, was deliberately designed to create an independent permanent institution — not one subject to reconstitution after each election or each change in political leadership.
“Guyana is a very fractured place, a very partisan place, and therefore we seem not to be able to see that the intent is for a commission to be independent,” Alexander said.
Representatives vs Nominees
Alexander argued that a fundamental legal distinction exists between a political representative and a constitutional nominee — and that GECOM commissioners fall into the second category, not the first.
He explained that a representative, by definition, holds a particular interest and is accountable to whoever they represent. A nominee, by contrast, is an appropriate person appointed to fill an office — but is not bound to the nominating party once appointed.
On this basis, he argued that there is no mechanism within the current law that allows a nominating political party or an opposition leader to unilaterally withdraw a commissioner.
Under the constitution, he said, commissioners can only be removed under strictly defined legal conditions — medical incapacity, resignation, or proven misconduct — none of which are triggered by a change in political leadership or a shift in party preferences.
The Counter-Argument
The story notes that while Alexander’s position represents a significant strand of legal commentary on the question, other legal commentators and political observers have argued that provisions for the removal of commissioners do exist. The transcript acknowledges that “some pundits argue that there are provisions for the removal of the commissioners.”
A Reform Proposal
Alexander also used the interview to suggest a potential reform direction for GECOM — pointing to Jamaica’s electoral model as a possible blueprint. He proposed a composition that balances partisan representation with an equal number of independent civil society experts, with the aim of reducing political deadlock within the commission.
Background
The question of GECOM’s composition and the tenure of its commissioners has been one of the most contested governance issues in Guyana’s recent history, directly linked to the disputed 2020 elections and the subsequent reforms noted by the Carter Center in its 2025 election observation report. The current dispute — over whether the new opposition leader can recall and replace opposition-nominated commissioners — is the latest chapter in that ongoing institutional debate.
