MARAD Emergency Head Admits SAR Deficiencies and Unregistered Beacon

By Antonio Dey | HGP Nightly News |

ARTHUR CHUNG CONFERENCE CENTRE, LILIENDAAL — The ill-fated state ferry MV Barima was severely overloaded when it slipped its moorings in Georgetown on the evening of July 18, 2026, carrying 179 people aboard—exceeding its certified maximum passenger-carrying capacity by 54 persons—the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (CoI) heard on Thursday.

Taking the witness stand on Day 7 of public evidentiary hearings at the Arthur Chung Conference Centre, Emergency Operations Coordinator at the Maritime Administration Department (MARAD), Captain John Flores, revealed that the true head count was only uncovered after state investigators reviewed terminal closed-circuit television (CCTV) security footage, discovering that dozens of passengers had boarded without being entered onto the official vessel passenger manifest.

Captain Flores’s testimony also laid bare systemic national search-and-rescue (SAR) vulnerabilities, confirming that the initial emergency beacon signal could not be identified because its statutory registration was incomplete, while acknowledging that MARAD has failed to rectify critical international maritime safety findings flagged by external audit bodies under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).

Port CCTV Audit Uncovers 54 Unmanifested Travelers

Captain Flores explained to commissioners that official paper records maintained prior to departure grossly misstated the volume of lives on board the state-operated vessel:

• Certified vs. Actual Capacity: The MV Barima had an authorized statutory carrying threshold capped at 125 persons.
• Revised Post-Disaster Census: Terminal video surveillance audits revealed a true count of 179 individuals aboard when the vessel departed Georgetown for Region One (Barima-Waini).
• Demographic Breakdown: The 179 persons comprised:
  • 81 adult males
  • 37 adult females
  • 43 children
  • 18 crew members

The revelation that 54 unrecorded individuals, including dozens of children, were permitted past terminal security gates onto an overloaded ferry places the boarding and manifest protocols of the Transport and Harbours Department (T&HD) under severe judicial scrutiny.

Unregistered Distress Beacon Paralyzed Early Response

Corroborating earlier testimony from Coast Guard Commanding Officer David Shamsudeen, Captain Flores admitted that emergency responders lost crucial early response time because watchstanders could not verify what kind of craft was in distress:

• Incomplete Registration: The Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) transmission received at 22:51 hours lacked specific identification data, leaving authorities unable to determine whether the distress coordinates came from a sinking watercraft or a downed aircraft.
• Operational Blindness: First responders were forced to spend valuable hours cross-referencing satellite tools and commercial tracking systems to identify the casualty.

“This was not registered to a particular vessel… saying earlier,” Captain Flores admitted under oath.

‘Finding FD-15’: Audit Flags MARAD’s Unresolved Safety Failures

Scrutiny intensified as the inquiry examined a formal Search and Rescue (SAR) audit report detailing deep administrative deficiencies within MARAD’s regulatory oversight:

• IMO Communication Void: The audit cited MARAD for failing to transmit verified data regarding Guyana’s operational search-and-rescue facilities, craft availability, and inter-agency arrangements to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
• Finding FD-15 (SOLAS Non-Compliance): The report established that MARAD had not drafted mandatory passenger ship cooperation plans between domestic SAR services and commercial vessels plying Guyana’s coastal waterways, in direct breach of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, and the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual.
• Unsubmitted Corrective Evidence: Although auditors had formally requested documentation to confirm whether corrective measures had been instituted, MARAD failed to provide the required proof, preventing verification that the flagged safety gaps had been closed.

Theoretical Emergency Plans vs. Offshore Reality

When questioned regarding Guyana’s overall capability to respond to maritime disasters, Captain Flores conceded that state assets remain acutely limited:

• Hypothetical Disaster Modeling: Flores drafted an emergency contingency plan designed around a major mass-casualty event on a large passenger liner. The model demonstrated that an effective rescue would require marshaling the entire Transport and Harbours Department ferry fleet alongside private offshore vessels.
• Partial Execution: The coordinator admitted the emergency plan was accessible to his team but was utilized only “to an extent” during the actual MV Barima search-and-rescue deployment.
• High-Risk Maritime Environment: Flores warned that Guyana’s rapidly expanding offshore commercial corridors—crowded with international cruise liners, container vessels, and fully laden crude oil tankers—urgently require comprehensive, multi-agency offshore collision protocols before a catastrophic incident occurs in deep water.

Hearings before the five-member commission continue at the Arthur Chung Conference Centre, as commissioners probe deeper into terminal manifest corruption, equipment registration failures, and regulatory compliance breakdowns at MARAD and the Transport and Harbours Department.