Crucial Hours Lost in Emergency Response; Notification Lapses Unveiled

By Antonio Dey | HGP Nightly News |

ARTHUR CHUNG CONFERENCE CENTRE, LILIENDAAL — The formal public evidentiary hearings of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (CoI) into the MV Barima disaster commenced on Wednesday, immediately exposing critical operational lapses, hours-long notification breakdowns, and severe systemic gaps across Guyana’s emergency response architecture.

Testimony heard on Day One revealed that an Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) aboard the vessel was completely unregistered, severely delaying efforts by international and local monitoring agencies to identify the stricken craft.

Furthermore, Rickford Samaroo, Director of Air Navigation Services at the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA), testified that he was only notified of the maritime disaster at 1:15 AM on July 19—nearly two and a half hours after automated systems detected the vessel’s initial satellite distress signal at 10:43 PM on July 18.

The disclosures prompted sharp questioning from commissioners regarding the operational timeline, the lack of timely aviation reconnaissance support, and the suspension of the Aeronautical Search and Rescue Coordination Centre’s operations while lives hung in the balance.

Unregistered Beacon and US Mission Control Alerts

Taking the witness stand before the five-member commission, Tia Valenzuela, Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) Officer at the GCAA, provided a minute-by-minute account of how international distress signals reached Georgetown:

• First Distress Detection: Working the 4:00 PM to midnight shift on the night of July 18, 2026, Valenzuela was alerted by a continuous beeping tone emitted by the Aeronautical Message Handling System at 10:43 PM.
• Rapid Satellite Triggers: Checking the consoles, she identified incoming distress transmissions from an EPIRB via the satellite network linked to the United States Mission Control Centre (US MCC). Multiple subsequent distress messages arrived in rapid succession between 10:44 PM and 11:37 PM.
• The Unregistered HEX ID: The beacon’s unique hexadecimal identification code (HEX ID) was unregistered within national and international databases. As a consequence, duty officers were unable to immediately link the signal to the state ferry MV Barima, verify ownership, or contact the vessel’s operators.

Coast Guard Relay and Coordination Discrepancies

Valenzuela detailed her initial procedural actions, noting that despite continuous incoming interruptions and operating with reduced station staff after another officer was allowed to leave, she pushed the raw data to military responders:

• Dispatching Coordinates: At 10:51 PM—eight minutes after the first alert—she forwarded the received coordinates and the unregistered HEX ID to the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) Coast Guard, where receipt was acknowledged by Commander Shamsuddin.
• Positional Inconsistencies: Updated geographic coordinates continued to stream in from the US MCC showing positional drift. While Valenzuela relayed these coordinates to maritime ranks, she acknowledged to commissioners that she was not technically equipped to assess the navigational significance of the variations.
• Handover: Managing the alert alongside routine duties, Valenzuela logged response feedback before officially handing over shift responsibilities to incoming duty officer Saskia Trapp at 11:46 PM.

Commissioners Scrutinize 2.5-Hour Delay and Suspended Aeronautical SAR

The most contentious phase of Wednesday’s hearing centered on the testimony of Air Navigation Services Director Rickford Samaroo, whose admissions laid bare institutional siloing during the unfolding tragedy:

• The Notification Vacuum: Despite automated distress alerts chiming at 10:43 PM and notifications reaching the Coast Guard by 10:51 PM, Samaroo testified that he only learned of the emergency at 1:15 AM on July 19—a delay of two hours and thirty-two minutes.
• Suspended Coordination Center: Commissioners aggressively questioned Samaroo regarding why the Aeronautical Search and Rescue Coordination Centre was not actively operational and coordinated to deploy aerial reconnaissance assets into the open Atlantic during the critical first hours of the capsize.
• Lack of Air Assets: Commission members pressed for answers on why night-capable rotor or fixed-wing aircraft were not mobilized immediately to drop life rafts, illuminate the sea, and pinpoint survivors struggling in the open ocean off Region One.

Day One’s evidentiary proceedings confirmed that systemic failures began not only on the high seas, but within the communication corridors and regulatory registries of the state’s transport infrastructure.

The public hearings at the Arthur Chung Conference Centre are slated to continue Thursday, as the Commission summons maritime regulators, harbor masters, and senior military officials to account for the delayed response to the July 18 disaster.